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CONTINGENT FEES AND CLASS ACTIONS
Janet Cooper Alexander*
In its pure form, the contingent fee is a pre-filing contractual agree-
ment setting the attorney's fee as a percentage of the recovery. Ex-
penses are advanced by the attorney to be reimbursed from the
recovery. If no recovery is obtained, the attorney receives no fee and
usually absorbs the out-of-pocket litigation expenses. Contingent fee
agreements can be viewed as a form of non-recourse, secured financ-
ing agreement; as a commission arrangement; or as a partnership or
joint venture in which the client contributes the claim and the lawyer
contributes the expertise and effort necessary to realize the claim.1 As
Professor Samuel Gross observes, the two salient characteristics of the
contingent fee are "no win no pay" and proportionality to the out-
come. 2 While contingent fees are rightly considered the hallmark of
plaintiffs' personal injury litigation (and are also found in other types
of cases brought by individuals and small businesses),3 they are also
indispensable in class action litigation. Contingent fees are the nearly
universal form of compensation for class counsel.4 Indeed, in most
* Professor of Law and Justin M. Roach, Jr. Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School, Principal
Investigator, Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation. An earlier version of this Comment
was presented at the Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social Policy, addressing
Contingent Fee Financing of Litigation in America, Chicago, Illinois, April 4-5, 1997.
1. In my view, contingent fees are not, from either the attorney's or the client's perspective, a
contract for litigation-cost insurance, as the Supreme Court erroneously reasoned in City of Bur-
lington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561, 567 (1992) (striking down a multiplier for contingent fees in
statutory fee-shifting cases).
2. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law... What Might Happen if Contingent Legal Fees
Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 321 (1998).
3. Id.
4. I refer here to plaintiff classes. "Pure" contingent fees are inapplicable to most defense
counsel, including counsel for defendant classes, because defendants do not stand to recover a
sum of money (unless they have a counterclaim, which is not usual in class litigation). A version
of the contingent fee is sometimes used by corporate defendants, in which the attorney shares in
the benefit of a better-than-expected result. For defendant classes, however, hourly fees are
probably more typical. For example, in securities litigation over initial public offerings a plaintiff
class sometimes sues a defendant class consisting of the syndicate of underwriters, naming the
lead underwriters as representative defendants. In these cases the members of the defendant
class have a pre-existing contractual agreement which authorizes the lead underwriters to defend
the action and to hire counsel for the class, who are paid by the hour as is customary for securi-
ties defense counsel.
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class action litigation no other form of compensation would be
practical.
Here we must define terms. The type of fee awarded to class coun-
sel does not fit the description of the contingent fee as seen in individ-
ual personal injury cases. The fee is not set by a pre-filing contract.
Indeed, it would be impossible for the class to contract with its attor-
ney before the suit is filed because the class does not come into exist-
ence, and its members cannot be bound, until the class is certified by
the court, usually well into the lawsuit.5 Instead, entrepreneurial law-
yers bring the case and the class into being on the prospect of an even-
tual fee based on a large aggregate recovery. Even after certification,
class counsel's fee is determined not by contract but by the court, fol-
lowing a fairness hearing at the conclusion of the case.
Moreover, the fee is not necessarily, and perhaps not even usually,
calculated as a percentage of the recovery. Class action fee awards
fall into two categories. In cases where the class obtains a monetary
recovery, the "common fund" doctrine invokes the equitable principle
of unjust enrichment to permit the class representative to recover
from the fund the cost, including attorneys' fees, of creating it.6 In
common fund cases, it is the client class that pays the fee, creating a
close parallel to individual contingent fee litigation. Where the law-
suit does not result in a common fund, federal courts are not permit-
ted to shift litigation costs to the defendants. 7 Attorneys' fees in such
cases must depend on the existence of a statute authorizing fee shift-
ing.8 In these cases, the fee award is assessed against the defendant.
In both types of cases, the court must award a "reasonable" fee. In
statutory fee-shifting cases and until recently in common fund cases,
most courts have used some version of the "lodestar" approach.9 The
starting point under this approach is the number of hours actually and
reasonably worked multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. This
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 23; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1940).
6. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1980).
7. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). The decision,
however, does not bind state courts. See Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 (Cal. 1977) (au-
thorizing attorneys' fee award to plaintiffs' attorneys who litigate successfully to protect state
constitutional rights).
8. The most important of these are the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1994), which authorizes the district court to award a reasonable attorney's fee to
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights litigation, and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b) (1994), which authorizes the award of a reasonable attorney's fee in civil actions
against the United States.
9. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 538-39 n.160 (1991) (collecting cases from every federal
circuit adopting lodestar methodology).
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amount is the "lodestar," which may then be adjusted up or down by a
"multiplier" based on factors such as the contingent nature of the re-
covery. 10 Recently, there has been a trend in common fund cases
away from the lodestar and toward a return to the percentage-of-the-
recovery method of calculating fees." Meanwhile, fee awards in stat-
utory fee-shifting cases have been tied more tightly to hourly
compensation.12
Nevertheless, fee awards in class actions do retain the essential
characteristics of contingent fees. First and most importantly, they
follow the "no win no pay" principle. Class action attorneys recover
fees only if the class prevails. In common fund cases, the fee is paid
out of the recovery, before any distribution to the class, just as in
traditional contingent fee litigation. Where a statute provides for fee
shifting, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable, court-
approved fee directly from the defendant. The "no win no pay" prin-
ciple means that the fee arrangement in class actions, as in individual
personal injury cases, provides a way for plaintiffs to finance litigation
10. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court chipped away at the number of factors that could
be considered in setting the multiplier in statutory fee-shifting cases. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 899-901 (1984) (allowing no enhancement for novelty or complexity of case, or for
quality of representation); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council (I), 478 U.S. 546,
567-68 (1986) (finding enhancement for quality of representation appropriate only in exceptional
cases); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992) (holding enhancement for contin-
gent normally not permitted). It may be that enhancement beyond the "fully compensatory"
lodestar amount is permitted only "in some cases of exceptional success." Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). Most courts have not regarded this line of cases as binding in deter-
mining fee awards in common fund cases, though they have become more restrained in the size
of the multipliers awarded. Correspondingly, lawyers in jurisdictions that retain the lodestar
approach have been careful to document sufficient hours to justify the desired fee without the
need for large multipliers.
11. See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989);
Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir. 1988); Bebchick v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Comm., 805 F.2d 396, 406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In the early days of class
actions, fees were commonly calculated as a percentage of the recovery, apparently by analogy
with contingent fees in personal injury cases. Recognizing that the percentage method created
incentives to early, cheap settlements, courts embraced the hours-based lodestar method in the
early 1970s. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Lindy I"), affd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d
102 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy II"). For a considerable time, this was the dominant method. In the
late 1980s, the pendulum began to swing back as courts recognized that an emphasis on hours
worked created an incentive to long and costly litigation for both sides. Courts desiring to lower
costs and reduce delays began to see the percentage method as a way to achieve the same result
earlier and cheaper. See, e.g., In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
12. See supra note 10. This development is somewhat ironic, as hourly billing came to
predominate among corporate law firms only within the last thirty years or so, and there has
been some movement even among these practitioners to "value," or non-hours-based, billing-
and even to contingent fee arrangements.
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when they lack the personal assets to do so and cannot obtain financ-
ing from more conventional sources.
Second, as a practical matter, fees are proportional to the recovery.
This is certainly true in common fund cases, where the trend is toward
a return to the percentage-of-the-recovery method. Even when the
lodestar method is nominally used, courts commonly "check their
work" by referring to the percentage of the recovery yielded by the
lodestar calculation. 13 In statutory fee-shifting cases as well, larger re-
coveries typically result in larger fees: larger stakes justify, in eco-
nomic terms, more intensive litigation efforts, and lawyers recognize
that courts will look to the amount of the recovery in determining
whether hours worked were "reasonable."
Thus, the core contingent fee attributes of "no win no pay" and
giving the lawyer a stake in the outcome are also central to class ac-
tion fees. Interestingly, the core rationales advanced by advocates
and opponents of contingent fees are the same as those cited for and
against class actions. Both contingent fees and class actions are
praised for providing access to those who would otherwise lack the
economic resources to vindicate their legal claims.' 4 Both are at-
tacked as ways by which plaintiffs' lawyers appropriate for themselves
too much of the recovery and take advantage of bargaining inequali-
ties in their relationships with their clients, and as incentives for bring-
ing too many or nonmeritorious cases. In light of these similarities, it
is worth asking Professor Gross's question in this less familiar context:
What would happen to class action litigation if contingent fees were
abolished?
Here we need to know more about the precise wording of the hypo-
thetical statute. If the statute barred all fee arrangements deferring
payment until the conclusion of the case-a "pay as you go" rule-we
can safely assume that class action litigation would be effectively
wiped out.15 The very premise of the class action device is that in its
13. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 539-40 n.161.
14. Class actions are also said to be more efficient than multiple individual litigation. The
efficiency rationale is less often heard as a justification for contingent fees, though this argument
is implicit in the claim made by both supporters and opponents that contingent fees allow the
lawyer to spread risk by diversifying, and encourage lawyers to screen cases for merit.
15. Having written this sentence, I am immediately uneasy with it. One need only recall the
confident predictions that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 would wipe out
securities class actions. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In fact, securities class actions
have continued to be filed and litigated at about the same rate as before the statute. JOSEPH A.
GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR'S Ex-
PERIENCE 3-9, 11 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School Working
Paper No. 140, Feb. 1997) (last modified Nov. 17, 1997) <http://securities.stanford.edu/report>;
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absence, no individual plaintiff would have the means or the motiva-
tion to pursue litigation. There might be a few exceptions at opposite
extremes of the class action spectrum.
In securities class actions, for example, every study has shown that a
large proportion of the recovery goes to a relatively few large inves-
tors; a dozen or two claimants may receive half or more of the recov-
ery. Such claimants, usually institutional investors such as pension
funds, would have both the means and the stakes needed to justify
litigation on their own. If contingent fees were statutorily barred, they
would be able to finance their suits by standard hourly fee arrange-
ments. But there is no reason to believe that these litigants would be
motivated to sue on behalf of a class as well. They would not thereby
increase their own recovery. To the contrary, increasing the number
of claims might dilute the amount they could expect to recover for
their own claims. The statute would prevent the lawyers from receiv-
ing a larger fee by representing the class, unless they could persuade
class members to contribute voluntarily after they were identified (but
before the conclusion of the case). At most, there would be an incen-
tive to identify other large claimants by, for example, advertising or
posting on the Internet, and to encourage them to use traditional join-
der methods to participate in a nonrepresentative lawsuit.16
At the other end of the spectrum, civil rights and other public inter-
est cases might continue to be brought by lawyers who volunteer their
time or are paid by public interest organizations. The number of these
cases would be reduced, as the resources available would be dimin-
ished by the inability to recover statutory fees (although fee-shifting
statutes might be invoked to allow successful plaintiffs to recover re-
imbursement from defendants for their legal expenses).
U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE CONGRESs ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT (Apr. 1997).
16. This technique is already used in litigation over limited partnerships, and the "most ade-
quate plaintiff" provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 have given
rise to a version of it, as plaintiffs' firms vie to sign up large numbers of shares (usually in the
form of large numbers of small investors) in order to take advantage of the statutory presump-
tion that the plaintiff or group of plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the litigation should
be named lead plaintiff. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-
1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1997). Such developments
might introduce more competition to the plaintiffs' bar or lead to different firms becoming domi-
nant in the field (though it is equally likely that existing firms would continue to maintain their
dominance on the basis of their expertise, as has happened under the 1995 securities litigation
reforms). See GRUNDFEST & PERiNo, supra note 15, at 25 (stating that the Milberg Weiss ap-
pearance rate went from 31.4% to 58.7%). It seems unlikely that they would result in a contin-
ued flow of class action litigation.
1998]
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Other types of class action litigation probably would not survive.
The size of individual consumer claims would not support litigation
financed by individuals or groups of class members, and tort plaintiffs
typically lack sufficient assets to pay as they go. Moreover, there is no
practical way to assess the class for ongoing litigation costs before a
recovery is achieved. Consumer and mass tort class actions, therefore,
would only be brought for free, by public interest or pro bono lawyers;
such cases, however, are unlikely to attract ideological lawyers.
Professor Gross suggests a number of responses to the abolition of
contingent fees. 17 These seem less likely to be effective in the class
action context. Cheating would be impractical, for any fee paid by the
class must be approved by the judge. Insurance would not fill the gap
either. Insurance against small consumer harms would be expensive,
and most people probably would not purchase it. Insurance against
mass torts is basically first-party health insurance. There would be
even less reason to purchase litigation insurance for such claims. In
any event, first-party litigation insurance would provide less universal
access to courts than contingent fees presently do. Self-representation
on a large scale is unlikely for small or complex claims.
The notion of a market for legal claims is also unpromising in the
class context.' 8 Even if legal rules were changed to permit a general
market for legal claims to exist, a market for class claims probably
would not emerge. The numerosity property suggests that claims buy-
ers could not sign up all the class members individually-but due pro-
cess would prevent selling the class's claim in the aggregate until a
complaint was filed and a class certified. In short, it would be difficult
to find someone with legal authority to sell. The same problem would
17. Gross, supra note 2, at 322-23.
18. Several years ago, Professors Macey and Miller proposed auctioning the class's claims to
class action lawyers as a way of eliminating conflicts of interest between the class and its lawyers.
Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Deriva-
tive Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6
(1991). In my view, this proposal would only make the conflict more stark, because at the time
of the auction the class would have no information and would be unrepresented, while the bids
would be deeply discounted because bidders would also lack information, as discussed in the
text. Macey and Miller argue that these problems will be taken care of by competition among
law firms eager to bid for the claims. This faith in the free market seems to be an example of the
Nirvana fallacy (in which all markets are thought to be perfect except the one under observa-
tion); it is belied by experience. Today, large numbers of law firms do not vie to be designated
lead counsel in most class actions. Indeed, when one court experimented with a competitive
bidding process, plaintiffs' lawyers were conspicuously unenthusiastic about competing. In re
Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("[pllaintiffs' lawyers ... have shown a
virtual allergy to price competition"). Some firms withdrew after competitive bidding was insti-
tuted, others formed coalitions to submit only one bid. Id. The public comments of plaintiffs'
lawyers have been negative. Id. at 690-97.
[Vol. 47:347
CONTINGENT FEES & CLASS ACTIONS
confront any effort to allow third parties, such as banks, to make non-
recourse loans secured by the eventual recovery, or to syndicate class
claims. In the current system, the lawyers for the class can obtain fi-
nancing based on their expected fee. This possibility would be elimi-
nated by the hypothetical statute.
From the class members' perspective, it is unlikely that individual
recoveries would be increased under either variety of market, or
claim-selling approach. The claims would be sold before discovery,
when class members have little or no information to enable them to
value the claims, as opposed to the present system when payment is
deferred until after discovery and motion practice. Class members
would not be represented by a knowledgeable attorney. The would-
be class attorneys would be in a complete conflict of interest with class
members on the other side of a financial transaction. The class's inter-
ests could not be adequately represented by the judge, who would
lack familiarity with the facts and circumstances necessary to value the
claim. Bidders, too, would have inadequate information to value the
claims. Uncertainty on both sides would lead to deep discounting, to
the class's disadvantage. Moreover, we have seen that despite compe-
tition, "standard" fee percentages persist in the contingent fee market
and there is little competition for lead counsel status in class actions
even when courts attempt to facilitate price competition. Finally, Pro-
fessor Gross plausibly predicts that claims buyers would tend to be
institutions that would consolidate claims and give them mass treat-
ment rather than resolving them individually.19 But in the tort area,
we see that individual recoveries are smaller under class treatment
than when claims are individually litigated, except perhaps for very
low-value claims. 20
It is hard to imagine, though, that a statute would be passed simply
banning arrangements until the conclusion of the case, and precluding
attorneys from collecting a fee if they are unsuccessful. "No win no
pay" is not only deeply ingrained in our legal consciousness, it is also a
very popular aspect of the legal system, as Professor Marc Galanter's
article shows.21 The rule would also be difficult to enforce, and does
not respond specifically to the most insistent criticisms of the present
system.
Would the hypothetical statute abolish existing fee-shifting statutes?
If not, civil rights class actions and other statutory fee-shifting cases
19. Gross, supra note 2, at 326-27.
20. See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2246 (1997).
21. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discon-
tents, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 457, 459 (1998).
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would survive (and prosper, as securities, mass tort and personal in-
jury lawyers flooded into the field). Proponents of class actions could
attempt to secure passage of fee-shifting statutes for other categories
of cases. The current legislative mood, however, does not seem hospi-
table to one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting. Rather, Congress has
flirted with proposals to eliminate the American Rule in favor of some
form of "loser pays" in a broad range of cases, including tort cases.
Two-way fee shifting, or "loser pays," would deter risk-averse individ-
ual plaintiffs of modest means (or even wealthy individuals) from pur-
suing expensive complex litigation against corporations. This effect
would be magnified in class action litigation because it would be im-
practicable to assess fee awards against individual class members. Ac-
tual fee-shifting proposals, such as those proposed in early versions of
the 1995 securities reform legislation, often seem directed at requiring
class action attorneys, rather than the class, to pay the prevailing de-
fendants' fees. Such measures would certainly have a deterrent effect
on lawyers, but some well-financed plaintiffs' firms might very well
stay in the field and flourish, particularly as "loser pays" would not
apply in cases that are settled without a finding or admission of
liability.
How would the statute deal with common fund cases-that is to say,
what aspects of common fund class action fee awards might be
banned? The most likely possibilities are to require fees to be calcu-
lated based on hours worked and to ban non-recourse fee arrange-
ments (i.e., "client pays, win or lose").
Abolishing non-recourse fee arrangements would be unworkable in
class actions. No one with substantial assets would agree to be a class
representative, and lawyers could not be forced to exact fees from cli-
ents who could not pay. The only way to enforce such a rule would be
to make ability to pay counsel fees a requirement for certification; if
enforced, the rule would likely disable class action litigation. But "no
win, no pay" is a very popular part of the legal system, at least outside
corporate executive suites, and there would be no real constituency
for requiring individuals to pay lawyers massive fees for litigation pur-
sued on behalf of others when no one received any money from the
lawsuit.
A more likely reform would be to ban percentage fees. The most
common criticism of contingent fees is that too much of the recovery
goes to the lawyers. In this view, lawyers exploit clients by forcing
them into percentage fee arrangements that overcompensate the law-
yers on an hourly basis. Professor Herbert Kritzer's study suggests
that this criticism is misplaced and that in the average case contingent
[Vol. 47:347
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fee lawyers are not compensated more generously than lawyers doing
comparable work for an hourly fee (though above-average fees in a
few cases make the risk worthwhile).22 One might expect, though,
that forbidding percentage-of-the-recovery fee agreements would be a
primary goal of opponents of contingent fees. The objection, in other
words, would be not so much to the contingent nature of the fee as to
a high-percentage commission. 23 Restricting percentage fees might
seem even more attractive in class actions, where aggregate recoveries
are large enough routinely to produce fees in the millions of dollars
and where public opinion may regard class members' alleged injuries
more skeptically than in individual tort cases.
It may seem ironic, then, that critics of securities class actions have
recently sought to require fees to be calculated as a percentage of the
recovery-the opposite of what one would expect in light of the de-
bate about contingent fees. Such a requirement was included in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 24 The
reason for conservative and defense-side support for the percentage
method appears to be that these critics desire earlier settlements with
less litigation expense (and, possibly, less disclosure to plaintiffs). The
supporters of percentage fees in class actions cannot be concerned
that too much money goes to lawyers under percentage arrangements
because they say that percentage fees will result in the same settle-
ments occurring earlier in the litigation, and because courts adopting
percentage rules in place of the lodestar have chosen percentage
benchmarks comparable to the percentage historically awarded under
the lodestar.25 These fees fall in the twenty to thirty percent range in
most cases, which is not too different from standard contingent fee
arrangements in personal injury cases.
In any case, banning percentage fees would have less effect on class
actions than on individual tort litigation, for hours-based fee rules
have been in effect for most class action fee awards for the last quarter
century. To be sure, the lodestar formula frequently operated as a sub
rosa percentage method because of liberal use of large multipliers.
But in fee-shifting cases, and to a lesser extent in common fund cases,
the use of large multipliers has declined and class action lawyers have
22. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998).
23. Doubtless the proscription would apply to investment bankers as well.
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77u-1, 78u-4 (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
25. See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 273 (9th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that a 25% benchmark figure is proper); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that the benchmark rate should be 30%, "absent extraordinary
circumstances").
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continued to find the field profitable. They have responded to hours-
based fee formulas by documenting their hours more carefully, staff-
ing more like corporate law firms, claiming hefty hourly rates (and
obtaining some hourly-fee work to substantiate the claimed rates),
and entering serious settlement discussions only after substantial
hours have been logged. 26 Common fund class actions are normally
filed only when the aggregated claims are large enough to justify a
satisfactory attorney's fee; increased staffing by associates billed at
high rates provides sufficient documentation to support the fee re-
quest. Moreover, any legislation that could actually pass might well
include a provision for a contingency premium (say, a multiplier of up
to two). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Bur-
lington v. Dague,27 it seems no more reasonable to ask lawyers to ig-
nore the time value of money, opportunity costs, and the risk of
nonpayment in deciding which cases to take, than to ask the same of
bankers setting loan rates.
Returning to a more general perspective, perhaps the most impor-
tant consideration in evaluating the effect on class actions of a ban on
contingent fees is the law of unintended consequences. We have not
discussed who would enact this hypothetical statute. A federal statute
would probably cover only federal court suits, 28 allowing cases to pro-
ceed in state court. Legislation at the state level would probably not
be universal or uniform, which should lead to increased levels of fil-
ings in states that continued to permit contingent fees. 29 Thus, an at-
tempted ban on contingent fees might simply shift contingent fee class
action litigation to courts in jurisdictions that did not adopt the ban.
Something similar occurred, at least temporarily, following the enact-
ment of the PSLRA. The Act contained a number of onerous proce-
dural provisions, including a heightened pleading standard, a
mandatory stay of discovery pending the resolution of a motion to
26. One consequence of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the percentage approach has been a
trend toward earlier settlements.
27. 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
28. An argument could certainly be made for regulation under the Commerce Clause, though
it would be tougher sledding after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The qualifica-
tions and ethical standards of lawyers have traditionally been matters for state control, however,
and Congress has not thus far attempted to regulate the attorney-client relationship or the com-
pensation of lawyers in state-court cases, except to strike down state regulation under the Con-
stitution. Recently, however, Congress has sometimes been surprisingly willing to legislate in
areas such as tort reform that have traditionally been left to the states.
29. Such a development might give new urgency to the question of whether a state court can
certify a nationwide class in a damages action.
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dismiss, and restrictions on the selection of the class representative. 30
Contrary to expectations, the number of filings did not change materi-
ally, but at least initially the number of cases filed in state court in-
creased dramatically-apparently the result of plaintiffs either fleeing
the federal courts for more favorable state fora, or filing in state and
federal court simultaneously to avoid the federal court discovery
stay.31 Data for 1997 suggest that the phenomenon may have been
only temporary; filings in both state and federal courts appear to have
returned to their pre-reform levels. The lesson appears to be that
squeezing the pipeline shut may not close off the flow of cases, but
may simply divert them to other courts or even have no effect at all.
Extending the "mind experiment" of imagining the abolition of con-
tingent fees to the class action context affords a new perspective on
the function and social value of contingent fees. It adds an important
category of litigation that would be impossible without contingent
fees. As with individual tort claims, we can (barely) imagine other
financing methods for class actions, but they would be difficult to con-
struct, might not work at all because of market failures and the diffi-
culty of bundling claims, and would probably result in decreased
access for meritorious claims. The market-oriented alternatives would
entail a serious loss of process values, including the opportunity to be
heard before an independent judge, represented by a loyal, competent
and knowledgeable attorney with access to information and evidence
relevant to the claim. Though these values may be endangered by the
class action device itself because of the attenuation of client control
over counsel for the class, contingent fees make access to the civil jus-
tice system possible in class actions, as they do in most claims by
individuals.
Thinking about abolishing contingent fees in class actions directs
attention to the separate components of this litigation institution, and
illuminates the different significance and effects of those components.
Doing away with "no win no pay" and instead requiring clients to
"pay as you go" and "pay, win or lose" would effectively kill off most
class action litigation for damages, though as Professor Gross ob-
serves, individual tort litigation could probably survive (even if by
cheating). 32 On the other hand, requiring compensation to be based
solely on hours worked would seriously decrease access for individual
30. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
31. See GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 15, at ii (stating that 26% of litigation activity
moved to state court in the first year after the Act was enacted).
32. Gross, supra note 2, at 323-24.
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plaintiffs by undercompensating their lawyers, but might not signifi-
cantly hamper class actions. That is to say, as Professor Kritzer has
observed, "no win no pay" is critical to contingent fees' role in in-
creasing public access to justice, while the percentage aspect is impor-
tant in assuring a supply of lawyers willing to take contingent fee
cases. 33 Additionally, fees in federal class action litigation are explic-
itly based either on statutes authorizing fee shifting or on the equita-
ble principle of unjust enrichment. It is difficult to justify displacing
either statutes specifically authorizing the award of contingent fees in
particular categories of cases or equitable principles of general appli-
cation. This insight suggests that the underlying principles of contin-
gent fees are more deeply embedded in our legal fabric, and more
generally accepted, than critics sometimes acknowledge.
Although class actions and personal injury cases appear to be exam-
ples of claims where some form of contingent fee provides the best
available method of financing litigation, the class action context also
illuminates some of the less attractive elements of the contingent fee
that are associated with the potential for conflict of interests between
the attorney and the client.34 Contingent fees create incentives for
lawyers to prefer settlement to trial, because a settlement assures that
the attorney will receive at least some fees, while trial carries the risk
of losing both out-of-pocket expenditures and the opportunity cost of
the time spent on the case. This incentive becomes more powerful as
cases become more complex and protracted and require more pretrial
expenses. Class actions, especially mass tort cases, are the paradigm
example.
The higher profitability of a high-volume practice, as shown by Pro-
fessor Kritzer,35 also provides an incentive to settle cases rather than
to try them. Indeed, as Kritzer also shows, the earlier cases are re-
solved, the more profitable they are for contingent fee lawyers, pro-
viding a strong incentive to settle cases early, perhaps before relevant
information is obtained and analyzed during discovery. 36 Taking cases
33. Kritzer, supra note 22.
34. Because the attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship, there is always a poten-
tial for conflict between the economic interest of the client and that of the agent. Different fee
arrangements manifest that conflict in different forms. For example, hourly fee arrangements
create incentives to overwork cases and to litigate inefficiently, and pro bono arrangements may
lead to insufficient loyalty to the client's interests, with the client's own personal interests being
subordinated to the lawyer's ideological goals. Contingent fees in class actions, however, lead to
distinctive conflict of interest problems. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plain-
tiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 716-20 (1986).
35, Kritzer, supra note 22, at 298-99.
36, Id. at 293-96.
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to trial takes longer than settling them, and trial time is both harder
work and less profitable than time invested at earlier stages. Settle-
ment smoothes out the distribution of outcomes, making total losses
less likely. This consideration may be particularly persuasive in com-
plex litigation where substantial out-of-pocket expenses and opportu-
nity costs are involved and where even "early" resolution may take a
long time. Absent effective client control (and it is absent in the typi-
cal class action) these incentive structures can lead to smaller
settlements.
In common fund cases, where the fee is paid out of the monetary
recovery as in individual personal injury cases, the lawyer's interest
will be to emphasize monetary recovery rather than looking to the
possibility of "enlarging the pie." This characteristic is probably more
important in some types of class actions than in the traditional tort
case, for in many types of class actions, nonmonetary structural re-
forms might serve the class's interest better and more efficiently than
distributing a large number of checks for trivial amounts. There is
little incentive to seek such solutions in a common fund class action.
In a perfect world, this incentive structure might be cause for concern.
In our world, however, one need look no further than coupon settle-
ments and Delaware shareholder derivative suits to conclude that the
risk of collusive nonmonetary settlements that benefit everyone but
the class probably outweighs the potential benefit of nonmonetary
solutions.
All of these considerations suggest that rather than abolishing con-
tingent fees, it would be worthwhile to fine-tune the procedures for
awarding fees in class actions to avoid some of the problems that may
flow from the incentive structures contingent fees create. Such re-
forms might include the following ideas.
1. Promote more effective monitoring by clients. Where possible,
class members with large stakes should be encouraged to participate.
In securities cases, for example, a significant share of the recovery in-
variably goes to large claimants, usually institutional investors. Very
large claimants could be required to opt in to be included in the class,
and opt ins could be required to serve, if requested, on a plaintiffs'
steering committee to oversee the conduct of the litigation. An inter-
mediate approach is taken by the PSLRA, which already requires no-
tice of the filing of an action and an opportunity for class members to
seek to be named class representatives. 37 Courts could seek ways to
37. Securities Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(A), 78u-4(a)(3)(A) (1983 & Cum. Supp.
1997).
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encourage formal or informal participation by class members, includ-
ing expanded use of the Internet to communicate with the class. In
the mass tort area, individually retained plaintiffs' attorneys might be
encouraged to play a monitoring role with respect to class counsel.
2. Minimize opportunities for conflicts of interest to arise. The
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Amchem v. Windsor38 raises diffi-
cult issues with respect to subclasses. The larger the class, the more
likely it is that there will be conflicts within the class and that settle-
ments will disadvantage some class members. As Amchem illustrates,
such conflicts are particularly troubling in the case of future claim-
ants,39 but they can exist even within classes that are apparently
homogeneous.40 Subclasses may be one way of dealing with this issue,
though they are cumbersome and may give rise to new conflicts. For
example, what happens to the fees of lawyers who agree that the sub-
class they represent-for example, exposure-only plaintiffs-should
receive no recovery? 41
Within the present class-action structure, however, there are simple
steps that could minimize conflicts between the class and its lawyers.
These include: requiring the recovery for the class to be negotiated
and approved separately from, and before, negotiation or approval of
fees to prevent both collusion and the type of exploitation approved in
Evans v. Jeff D.;42 stating the class recovery on a per claim basis rather
than an aggregate lump sum for the entire class, so that the notice of
settlement will be in a more useful form for the class; and requiring
the defendant to pay the class's attorney's fees directly to assure an
adversary presentation throughout the fairness hearings to assist the
judge in protecting the interests of the class.
3. Tie the lawyers' compensation directly to the interests of the class.
The application, briefing and hearing on the fee request should not
take place until after all claims are filed, and the judge should be re-
quired to take into account the actual benefit conferred on the class
(as demonstrated by the claims made) as well as the effort and skill
38. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
39. Id. at 2251-52.
40. See In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 1410, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing
to certify plaintiffs as a class because of intra-class conflicts).
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr., After the High Court Decision in 'Amchem Products Inc. v. Wind-
sor,' Can a Class Action Ever Be Certified Only for the Purpose of Settlement? NAT'L L.J., July
21, 1997, at B4, B6 ("If a plaintiffs' counsel ... settles for no cash payment, but only the right to
medical monitoring, such an attorney should be entitled to an attorney fee equal to one-third of
zero plus an annual paid doctor's appointment").
42. 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (approving settlements conditioned on waiver of statutory attorney's
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required to obtain the result, in determining an appropriate fee, which
would not be limited to compensation for actual hours worked.
Narrowly-targeted measures such as these could greatly reduce the
potential for attorney-client conflicts of interest inherent in class liti-
gation. Yet they are manageable and should be achievable, indeed,
some would not even require legislation. Such reforms are greatly to
be preferred to broad-brush attacks on contingent fee lawyers that, if
taken to their logical conclusion, could make it impossible to bring
class actions.
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